IRAN: WHY DOES THE BALD MAN FIGHT FOR A COMB?
يمكنكم الآن متابعة آخر الأخبار مجاناً من خلال حسابنا على تويتر
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Why would a bald man fight tooth and nail to get a comb? The question fits the situation in which the Islamic Republic of Iran finds itself regarding its controversial nuclear program.
Despite the latest diplomatic maneuvers, it is clear that Tehran is determined to ignore demands, made by the United Nations Security Council, that it suspend its uranium and plutonium enrichment activities.
For its part, the Obama administration is desperately trying to get a deal which would recognize Iran’s right to enrich uranium in exchange for slowing down its cadence.
All this is rather puzzling. Iran does not have any nuclear power plant that might need enriched uranium& as fuel. The only Iranian nuclear power plant built by Russia in Hellieh on the Bushehr Peninsula operates on a limited timetable with the hope that one day it might provide some 2 per cent of the nation’s electricity.
Even then, the supply of fuel it needs is guaranteed for the first 10 years of its operation, with a Russian offer to provide all the needed fuel for the plant’s entire lifespan of 37 years.
To sum up: Iran does not need any enriched uranium at least until 2024. After that, Iran would still have no need of domestic uranium enrichment for the Hellieh plant until 2048.
Iran’s plutonium project is even more intriguing. It does not have any heavy water power plants that might need plutonium, and no plans to build any. In other words, Iran is spending vast sums of money on a project for which it has no obvious use. Unless, of course, the plutonium in question, as the enriched uranium discussed above, is meant for purposes other than producing electricity.
It is hard to argue a case in favor of nuclear power in Iran. Iran has the world’s second or third largest oil reserves and the second largest reserves of natural gas. Even if Iranian domestic consumption were to reach average Western levels in the next decade or so, Iran would still have enough domestic resources for more than 400 years.
As several studies by Iranian academics have shown, nuclear power would be at least 27 per cent more costly to produce and distribute than electricity generated by oil, gas or hydroelectric power plants, not mention solar projects.
There is yet another argument against nuclear power plants in Iran. The whole country is located on one of the most active earthquake zones in the world. Hellieh, the place where the only nuclear power plant is located, has been destroyed by earthquakes on at least three occasions in the past century or so.
Pouring Hellieh’s cooling water back into the Gulf could do untold harm to the environment in the region while the problem of what to do with the spent fuel remains unsolved. The idea of burying it under the waters of the Gulf or in the Iranian Lut Desert is regarded by many Iranian experts as “sheer lunacy”.
Not surprisingly, the nuclear issue has never been debated in the Islamic Majlis or explained to the Iranian public. It is a grave decision taken by a handful of men and against the advice of many Iranian scientists and academics.
So why is the Islamic Republic ready to take big risks in order not to suspend uranium enrichment even for a few years in exchange for the easing of sanctions?
The obvious answer is that the Islamic Republic wants to put itself in a position to build an arsenal of nuclear weapons.
The problem, however, is that Khomeinism, the ruling ideology in Iran today, has a logic of its own which is not easily understood in terms of mainstream international behavior.
In that logic, the Islamic Republic, as the embodiment of the Only Truth, is not bound by laws, regulations and norms of behavior developed by the “Infidel”.
Matters became more complicated in 2006 when President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad turned the issue of uranium enrichment into the ultimate red line for the regime.
The 5+1 must understand that in Iran today the issue of uranium enrichment goes beyond its diplomatic and security aspects. This issue has come to symbolize two visions of the Khomeinist revolution.
The first is that of people like former presidents Hashemi Rafsanjani who believe that the task of the revolution is to consolidate its hold on Iran, leaving the idea of “exporting the revolution” for future generations.
In that sense people like Rafsanjani resemble the advocates of “Socialism in One Country” in the USSR of the 1920s. The “Supreme Guide” Ali Khamenei and his entourage, however, resemble the Russian advocates of “Permanent Revolution” in the same period.
What the outside world is facing is a regime determined to impose its agenda on the region-with or without nuclear weapons. The issue of uranium enrichment has become an issue of Iran’s domestic politics and the demarcation line between two visions for the future of Iran and the region.
&By accepting the continuation of Iran’s uranium project even at a lower level as John Kerry is trying to sell, Obama would give the hardline faction a boost at a time that Khamenei is dreaming of a new Palestinian Intifada, a Shi’ite uprising against Saudi Arabia, the seizure of power by Shi’ite sin Bahrain and Bashar al-Assad’s total victory in Syria.
The bald man may not need a comb to look after his nonexistent hair. But he needs it to prove that he can do as he pleases and that no one could stop him.